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section of a bus commits a crime. 5 Incredible as it does seem, a
physician's license to practice medicine in this State could be sus-
pended on such bases.
The court leaves these questions to the good sense and judg-
ment of the Board of Regents. However, what considerations
should influence the Regents in their determination of the mode
of punishment, and how severe it shall be, is not for the court to
consider. In fact, the court is wholly without jurisdiction to re-
view such questions.28
The construction of this statute, to include a crime, anywhere
committed, as a basis for suspension of a physician's license,
coupled with the grant of uncontrolled discretion to the Board of
Regents as to what matters to consider in making a determination,
and what discipline to mete out, raises fundamental and substan-
tial questions as to the constitutionality of the delegation. This
question the court did not consider at all.
Without some guides governing the exercise of discretion in
this area, "there would be no effective restraint upon unfair dis-
crimination or other arbitrary action by the administrative offi-
cial. ' ' 27 A statute's validity is to be judged not by what has been
done under it, but by what might be done under it.2"
Workmen's Compensation
a. Course of Employment: Injuries are compensable under
the Workmen's Compensation Law only if they arise "out of and
in the course of employment."129  Common law concepts of scope
of employment are not to confine the determination of that ques-
tion.8
Decided in the 1952-1953 term were two cases involving the
question whether the risks of travel were also the risks of employ-
ment. In Lewis v. Knappen Tippetts Abbett Engineering Corp.,)"
25. ALA. CODE, 1940, tit. 48, § 301 (31A); LA. Rxv. STAT., 1950, tit. 45, § 195;
N. C. GEN. STAT., 1950, §§ 62-121.71, 62. 121.72.
26. Sagos v. O'Connell, 301 N. Y. 212, 93 N. E. 2d 644 (1950). There the court -
said, at 214, 93 N. E. 2d at 645:
"Under § 1296 of Art. 78 of the Civil Practice Act we find no provision for
the judicial review of the measure of punishment imposed as an incident to
disciplinary action ordered by an administrative board . . . where . . . the
Appellate Division has upheld a finding of a statutory violation which is
made the sole basis for such punishment."
27. Small v. Moss, 279 N. Y. 288, 299, 18 N. E. 2d 281, 285 (1938).
28. Packer Collegiate Inst. v. Univ. of State of N. Y., 298 N. Y. 184, 81 N. E.
2d 80 (1948).
29. WORMTEN'S ComPENsATioN LAW § 10.
30. Cardillo v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 330 U. S. 469 (1946); Matter of Waters
v. Taylor Co., 218 N. Y. 248, 112 N. E. 727 (1916).
31. 304 N. Y. 461, 108 N. E. 2d 609 (1952).
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an engineer, hired in New York, was sent by his employer to
Israel to advise the government there on railroad problems. His
work almost completed, he took a sightseeing trip to Jerusalem
where he was killed by unidentified Arabs who attacked the United
Nations convoy in which he was traveling. The court affirmed
(4-3) the award. In Davis v. Newsweek Magazine, 2 the four week
vacation of the science editor of a magazine was extended, and
money given him by his employer, so he might visit additional
places of scientific interest for use in his work. En route between
two places in his itinerary he stopped at a summer resort, and,
hot and tired, went for a swim. He was fatally injured in a dive.
The award here was reversed (4-3).
The two cases are close. Six judges maintained a consistent
position, the three dissenters in each case voting with the majority
in the other.
The distinction between the cases, if indeed there is one at all,
lies apparently in the fact that whereas the engineer in the Lewis
case was sent on his travels by the employer, the science editor
in the Davis case voluntarily undertook his trip. Judge Cardozo
said, in Matter of Mark's Dependents v. Gray:'
The decisive test must be whether it is the employment or
something else that has sent the traveler forth upon the journey
or brought exposure to its perils . . To establish liability
the inference must be permissible that the trip would have been
made though the private errand had been cancelled.
The deaths of the employees in both cases resulted not from
the travels themselves, but from a deviation from those travels.
Using the common-sense viewpoint of the average man34 it is diffi-
cult to perceive any vital difference between the cases grounded
on the question of why the employee undertook his journey.
The death of an insurance investigator was held (5-2) not to
be in the course of employment, when he was killed in an automo-
bile accident while returning on Monday morning to the area
where he worked; from his summer hdme in the Catskill Mountain
region. The trip there Friday evening was personal, and although
when Monday came he had to retrace his route and return to
work, the work did not create the necessity for travel5 5 This re-
sult is consistent with the doctrine holding that an employer in-
32. 305 N. Y. 20, 110 N. E. 2d 406 (1953).
33. 251 N. Y. 90, 93, 167 N. E. 181 (1929).
34. Urged in Matter of Masse v. Robinson Co., 301 N. Y. 34, 37, 92 N. E. 2d 56,57 (1950).
35. Glickman v. Greater New York Taxpayers, 305 N. Y. 431, 113 N. E. 2d 548
(1953).
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jured on his way to the place where he was to render service may
not recover."
In Tedesco v. General Electric Corp.,T the claimant was a
member of the General Electric Athletic Association, a member-
ship corporation open only to employees of G. E.'s Schenectady
plant. An injury incurred in a soft ball game, part of the athletic
program, was held compensable as arising out of and in the course
of employment. The court viewed the activities of this associa-
tion as furthering employee relations and good will for these
reasons:
1. the activities were on the employer's premises;
2. there was substantial financial support by employer;
3. there was dominant control by employer;
4. advertising and business advantage benefited the em-
. ployer.
The case of Wilson v. General Motors,8 which denied com-
pensation for a ballgame injury, was distinguished on the basis
that the games were in no way connected with the employer and
that no business advantage or benefit accrued to it.
Although Workmen's Compensation is not confined by com-
mon law concepts of scope of employment, 9 apparently the doc-
trine that the employee be engaged at the time of his injury in
activity of benefit to his employer still persists to a degree.
b. Exclusiveness of Remedy: Workmen's Compensation is
a new system in its entirety, substituted for an objectionable one.40
It imposes on the employer liability without fault, and abolishes
the application of the doctrines of negligence, contributory negli-
gence, assumption of risk, and negligence of fellow servants in
this area, as well as providing that liability of the employer shall
be exclusive of any liability at common law.41  The Legislature
intended to bar actions at common law, however, only in those
fields in which is had created liability to provide compensation
regardless of fault."
36. Matter of Kowalek v. N. Y. Consol. R. R. Co., 229 N. Y. 489 122 N. E. 888(1920) ; Pierson v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 184 App. Div. 678, 2 N. Y. S. 492(1st Dep't), aff'd, 227 N. Y. 666, 124 N. E. 899 (1920).
37. 305 N. Y. 544, 111 N. E. 2d 33 (1953).
38. 298 N. Y. 468, 84 N. E. 2d 781 (1949).
39. See note 30 supra.
40. Shanahan v. Monarch Engineering Co., 219 N. Y. 469, 478, 114 N. E. 795,
798 (1916).
41. WoKmEzN's CoMPENsATIoN LAW §§ 10, 11, 38, 39.
42. Barrencotto v. Cocker Saw Co., 266 N. Y. 139, 194 N. E. 61 (1934).
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An interesting problem concerning the exclusiveness of the
remedy was posed to the court in this term." An employee sued
his employer in a common law suit to recover damages for injuries
he sustained due to a condition in him known as partially disabling
silicosis, which condition, it was alleged, was caused by the de-
fendant's negligence. The granting of defendant's motion to dis-
miss the complaint under Rules of Civil Procedure 106 and 107"
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Silicosis is on the list of occupational diseases for which com-
pensation is payable, but the act specifically provides that com-
pensation is payable for silicosis only when it results in total
disability." The plaintiff claimed the law does not bar this suit,
and if the statute were so construed as setting up such a bar, it
would be violative of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal
Constitution as depriving him of any remedy."'
On its merits the court holds that the Legislature did not in-
tend the employee should recover possibly heavy damages in the
partial stage, and also a later award for total disability 7
However, what the court says is dictum. In essence the real hold-
ing is that a common law suit is not the proper way to test the
constitutionality of the bar against such suits. A demurrer to the
complaint defeats the plaintiff in his basic contention, right or
wrong. Even if the bar should be unconstitutional, plaintifl
would still not possess the right to recover damages at common
law. The Act of 1935, which allowed recovery for partially dis-
abling silicosis would then be relieved of its invalid amendment
and would revive.-8 Plaintiff's sole remedy is a proceeding under
the Workmen's Compensation Law, irrespective of the validity or
invalidity of the provisions in question."
Tort Liability of Admizistrative Offlcial
Generally, if an officer's duty is owing solely to the public, an
aggrieved individual has no right of action against an officer for
a breach thereof. But a different public policy operates as to
43. Cifolo v. General Electric Co.. 305 N. Y. 209, 112 N. F 2d 197 (1953).
44. On the grounds: (1) that certain parts of the various causes of action wer
barred by the lapse of time; (2) none of the counts contained facts sufcient to con-
stitute a cause of action; (3) the court has no jurisdiction of any of the actions.
The court found it unnecessary to deal with the question as to the statute of
limitations.
45. Woaxmw's Co .s&azon- LAw §3. subd. 2.
46. New York Central R. P. v. WAe4, 243 U. S. 188 (1916).
47. See 2 LAesoN, Wobmwxns C wav-x.AImTO Lw 141 (19S2), for cases up-
holding statutes of other states denying a remedy for partial silicosis disability.
48. The court follows Powers v. Porcelabs Insuda or Corp., 285 N. Y. 54, 32 N. E.
2d 790 (1951).
49. Scherini r. Titanim Alloy Co., 286 N. Y. 331. 37 N. .2a 237 (1941).
50. Larson v. Marsh, 144 Neb. 664, 14 X. W. 2d 189, 192 (1944).
